July 15, 1998
"ASSAULT WEAPON" BAN IN COLUMBUS, OHIO,
RULED UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The "assault weapon" and high capacity magazine bans in
Columbus, Ohio, have been declared unconstitutional by a federal
appellate court. This decision nullifies similar bans with
identical language, such as that in Cleveland and other cities.
On July 15, 1998, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, sitting in Cincinnati, Ohio, declared the Columbus
"assault weapon" ban unconstitutionally vague and a violation of
equal protection of the law. Judge Suhrheinrich wrote the opinion.
Peoples Rights Organization, Gerald Smolak, and Dennis Walker, who
challenged the law, are represented by Stephen P. Halbrook, who
argued the case.
The court held two grandfather clauses violative of equal
protection. Under these clauses, the only persons allowed to
possess assault weapons and high capacity magazines were persons
who registered assault weapons under the old ordinance previously
declared by the Court of Appeals to be vague. The court
invalidated all five of the definitions of "assault weapon" to be
unconstitutionally vague.
The court found that the controversy is justiciable and that
the plaintiffs were threatened with prosecution under the
ordinance. Further, it noted that "the current law is not subject
to any type of clarifying interpretation by a local administrative
agency. Rather, the words of the ordinance provide the sole source
of guidance for firearms' owners."
On the merits, the court first treated the equal protection
clause, which "keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating
differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike."
(Citing Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)). Section
2323.31(B)(3) exempts from prosecution "any person who lawfully
possessed an assault weapon and who registered that assault weapon
pursuant to former Columbus City Codes Section 2323.05 in 1989."
"Thus, the City's grandfather provision is predicated upon an
ordinance that we previously invalidated, precisely because it
failed to place firearms' owners on notice as to whether or not
their firearms were 'assault weapons.'" The court held that the grandfather provision fails the rational basis test. "There simply
exists no rational distinction between the individual plaintiffs in
this case and those persons who registered their firearms during a
thirty day window in 1989 on the basis of little more than a hunch
that their firearms might constitute 'assault weapons' under the
City's unconstitutionally vague ordinance."
The court also invalidated a grandfather clause for magazines
held as part of registered assault weapons. It upheld a clause
exempting magazines owned by a person who has a firearm registered
under the National Firearms Act. However, the effect of the former
is that the magazine ban violates equal protection and is void.
The decision is not a model of clarity on this issue, but the
invalidity of the magazine ban is the necessary consequence of
finding its grandfather clause violative of equal protection.
The court then turned to the vagueness issue. Noting that a
strict test applies where criminal penalties are at stake, the
court also enquired "whether the statute contains a scienter
requirement or imposes strict liability. . . . Indeed, 'in the
absence of a scienter requirement . . . a statute is little
more than a trap for those who act in good faith.'" (Quoting
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979) (brackets and
internal quotation marks deleted). The ordinance here has no
knowledge element and imposes strict liability. Given the criminal
penalties and lack of a scienter requirement, "a relatively
stringent review of the City's assault weapons ban is necessary."
Even if the ordinance required a showing of recklessness, the same
strict test would apply, for mere possession of any firearm could
arguably meet that standard.
The court proceeded to find all of the definitions of "assault
weapon" vague. The first definition is "any semiautomatic action,
center fire rifle or carbine that accepts a detachable magazine
with a capacity of 20 rounds or more." The court explained:
record indicates that any semiautomatic rifle that accepts a
detachable magazine will accept a detachable magazine of any
capacity which might exist, as it is the magazine, and not the
rifle, that determines capacity. Therefore, anyone who
possesses a semiautomatic center fire rifle or carbine that
accepts a detachable magazine is subject to prosecution so
long as a magazine exists with a capacity of twenty rounds or
more. Since the ordinance contains no scienter requirement,
an owner's complete lack of knowledge as to the magazine's
existence is of no consequence.
One plaintiff has a hunting rifle that has a detachable
magazine with a capacity of four rounds. He has never possessed or
seen any other magazine which would fit his rifle. However, his
rifle would accept a detachable magazine with a capacity of twenty
rounds or more if one has ever been manufactured. He "would face
criminal penalties in the event such a magazine is discovered. Due
process demands more than this."
The second definition of "assault weapon" is "any
semiautomatic shotgun with a magazine capacity of more than six
rounds." Reversing the district court, which upheld this
provision, the court found it vague:
Shotgun rounds are available in different lengths.
Rounds of a short length may cause a shotgun's magazine
capacity to exceed six rounds. Conversely, rounds of a longer
length (which may be all the owner possesses or is aware of)
will result in a capacity that is less than six rounds. This
provision is a trap for the unwary. It imposes criminal
liability regardless of whether a shotgun owner knows of the
existence of shorter length rounds. Hence, we find this
definition unconstitutionally vague.
The third definition of "assault weapon" includes a
semiautomatic handgun which is a modification of a rifle defined
as an assault weapon or a modification of an automatic firearm. It
also includes a semiautomatic handgun originally designed to accept
a detachable magazine with a capacity of more than twenty rounds.
The first and third of these are vague for the reasons stated above
regarding a rifle or carbine defined as an assault weapon. The
second of these, with its reference to a "modification," is vague
in that "ordinary consumers cannot be expected to know the
developmental history of a particular weapon." "The evidence in
this case indicates that an average gun owner does not know whether
or not his weapon is a modification of another weapon."
The fourth definition of "assault weapon" is any weapon that
"may be restored" to one of the above. This is vague not only
because the above are vague, but also because "the phrase 'may be
restored' fails to provide sufficient guidance to a person of
average intelligence as to what is prohibited." "No standard is
provided for what may be restored' means, such as may be restored
by the person in possession, or may be restored by a master
gunsmith using the facilities of a fully-equipped machine shop."
(brackets omitted).
The fifth definition of "assault weapon" is "any part, or
combination of parts, designed or intended to convert a firearm
into an assault weapon as defined [above], or any combination of
parts from which an assault weapon as defined [above] may be
readily assembled." This is vague not just because the above
definitions are vague but also because "'may be readily assembled'
does not provide sufficient information to enable a person of
average intelligence to determine whether a particular combination
of parts is within the ordinance's coverage."
The court next addressed the City's argument that Springfield
Armory v. City of Columbus (6th Cir. 1994), which invalidated the
first assault weapon ban passed by Columbus, suggested that generic
definitions are appropriate instead of a listing of makes and
models. The court responded that such dictum was not meant to
endorse any specific definitions.
Columbus also "points out that Cleveland's ordinance served as
the model for the instant one and that the Ohio Supreme Court
upheld the validity of Cleveland's ordinance in Arnold v. City of
Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163 (Ohio 1993)." However, "the Ohio Supreme
Court in Arnold did not consider a vagueness challenge to the
ordinance in question."
Although not raised by the plaintiffs or briefed by the
parties, the court stated in dictum that the ordinance was not
invalid under state and federal guarantees concerning the right to
keep and bear arms. "Nevertheless, it is well established that due
process protects our citizens from vague legislation even when that
legislation regulates conduct which otherwise does not enjoy
constitutional protection."
In sum, the Columbus assault weapon ban is nullified by the
decision based on the grandfather clause being violative of equal
protection and all of the assault weapon definitions being vague.
The high capacity magazine ban is nullified because its grandfather
clause is violative of equal protection.